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JOINT EMPLOYMENT:
THE UNINTENDED AND UNPREDICTABLE
"EMPLOYMENT" RELATIONSHIP
The following is a transcript of a 2018 Federalist Society panel
The Unintended and Unpredictable
entitled Joint Employment:
"Employment" Relationship. The panel originally occurred on November 15,
2018, during the National Lawyers Convention in Washington, D.C. The
panelists were: Richard Epstein, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law and
Director, Classical Liberal Institute, New York University Law School;
Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Of Counsel, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC; and Hon.
Philip A. Miscimarra, Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. The
moderator was the Honorable Timothy M. Tymkovich of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.*

[RECORDING BEGINS]

HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Let's go ahead and get started.
Good afternoon. If somebody could get the doors, please, that would be
helpful. My name is Tim Tymkovich. I'm the Chief Judge of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, headquartered in the Wild, Wild West, Denver,
Colorado, and it's a pleasure to have a panel like this because it's a bit of a
Wild, Wild West in labor and employment. It's also interesting to come off
a panel discussion on stare decisis, our lunchtime topic, because there's going
to be many elements of that in today's discussion. The issue that we're going
to discuss is the vast web of federal and state laws protecting employees
stands or falls on a single concept: is there an employment relationship?
Payment of overtime, responsibility for employment taxes, union obligations,
responsibilities for workplace discrimination, worker's compensation--every
employment law obligation depends on the existence of the employment
relationship.'

* The footnotes contained herein have been added by the University of Dayton Law Review for
reference.
See, e.g, Jim Pocius, The Employer/Employee Relationship in Workers Compensation, IRMI (Nov.
2000), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/the-employer-employee-relationship-in-worker
s-compensation; Employer Tax Obligations, GRASSHOPPER, https://grasshopper.com/academy/understand
ing-employee-responsibilities/employer-payroll-tax-obligations/ (last visited June 15, 2020); Employer/
Union Rights and Obligations,NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/
rights/employer-union-rights-and-obligations (last visited June 15, 2020); FAQ #2: What Are My
Responsibilities Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws?, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/smallbusiness/faq/what are my-responsibilities.cfm (last
visited June 15, 2020).
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That may be surprising to some that most employment laws do not
defme who is an employer or who is an employee. The Fair Labor Standard
Act, for example, defines an "employer" as "any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee," and an
employee is "any individual employed as an employee." 2 The National Labor
Relations Act also makes us dizzy with circular definitions. 3 An "employer"
is a "person acting as an agent of the employer, directly or indirectly," and an
"employee" is "any employee," and on, and on, and on.4
Well, today's panel is going to try to make some sense of that. We're
going to start with Professor Richard Epstein of the NYU Law School, a
prolific writer and thinker in this area. And he's going to offer some broad
topics about the subject matter before we get into the weeds. Our second
speaker is Phil Miscimarra. He's a partner at Morgan & Lewis and has a long
history working on employment matters. He's the former chairman of the
U.S. National Labor Relations Board, and he currently leads Morgan &
Lewis's NLRB practice. Our third speaker is Dick Griffin, who has joined us
as a former member of the National Labor Relations Board, and in 2012 he
was the recess appointment to the NLRB by President Obama. He was then
nominated by President Obama and confirmed by the U.S. Senate as General
Counsel of the Board where he served until October 2017. With that, let's
begin with Professor Epstein.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: I have to stand because I can't look into the
light. I've given an immense amount of thought and preparation to this. This
is actually a topic of great importance in terms of what's happened, and the
judge, I think, actually laid on the line how much turns on so much little. The
first thing I want to do is to pose a kind of a paradox, and then ask yourself
how it's resolved in one system or another. And the paradox is that the
question about the relationships between an independent contractor and an
employee, for example, is something which exists in common law as well as
existing in circumstances under these variety of statutes.5
If you look at all of the literature that has accumulated, it turns out
that ninety-nine percent of the literature that accumulates is on the statutory
definition, and there seems to be nothing close to the level of angst that exists
on this same question when you start to look at it as a common law matter.
That doesn't mean that there are no issues of common law, and I'll try and
describe what they are in a second, but I think it's the tortious line between
employees and independent contractors.
28 U.S.C. § 203(d)-(e) (2006).
' See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
4 Id § 152(2)-(3).
' See, e.g., Chelsie Cauthon, How to Determine if You Have an Employee ofIndependent Contractor,
DOMINION (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.dominionsystems.com/blog/how-to-determine-in-an-employeremployee-relationship-exists.
2
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The distinction between a simple employee and an independent
contractor may look to the uninitiated like an arid dispute chiefly of interest
to lawyers who cannot find a better way to spend their time. But in fact, it is
the most important, if most elusive, distinction in modem labor law. It is
critical not only for the operation of the National Labor Relations Act, but
also the full range of other legislation that deals with employer/employee
relationships, most notably the Fair Labor Standards Act that regulates
minimum wage and overtime regulation.6 It also plays a vital role in dealing
with state labor statutes as well.7
Why is this distinction so important?
Because independent
contractors are not covered by these statutes, while employees are.8 The
statutes are, moreover, coercive, so that the location of the boundary line tells
us much about the scope and power of the federal government and, of course,
state governments when not preempted by federal statute.
To set the framework of the discussion, I would like to propose a
paradox of sorts about a distinction that had its origins in the common law,'
with its general devotion to freedom of contract, and the regulatory state that
on key issues explicitly rejects that premise. The paradox is this: the common
law discussions of the topic contain little of the angst that drives these
statutory disputes. So here is the challenge: why is it that this characterization
problem seems to be relatively easily solved in the private law context, but
seems to be solved only with enormous difficulty in the public law context?
To answer that question, we have to move back one step and ask this question:
"What do we think about the categorization of relationships as a matter of
common law and how does it work?"
Throughout the history of both common and Roman law, it is easy to
find cases of stark oppositions between categories. So, for example, in
property we have the difference between a licensee and a lessee.9 Elsewhere,
we observe a sharp distinction between contracts for sale and contracts for
hire." Each of these relations are defined by a stark opposition between
relatively pure types. Once the pure types are identified, it is then possible
for the commentators to attach a set of standard "incidents" that give clear
guidance on how various disputes should be resolved, including say those
related to the risk of loss for the destruction of either some structure, animal,
or chattel that is subject to divided ownership. Thus, under Roman law, there
are six different types of bailments, and the commentators attached incidents
for risk of loss on all of them-a characterization that was then carried
6 See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207(a)(2).
7 See, e.g., Dynamex v. Super. Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 29 (Cal. 2018).

8 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69,201-19.
9 See, e.g., Difference Between Lease and Licence: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL,
https://www.upcounsel.com/difference-between-lease-and-licence (last visited June 15, 2020).
0 See generallyContractsforServices DistinguishedfromThose to Sell Goods, 15 FOR.DHAM L. REV.
92(1946).
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through to Anglo-American law in the great case of Coggs v. Bernard.11
One reason why these classifications prove so durable in the private
law is that ordinary people, in organizing their private affairs, prefer to stay
with relatively clear polarizations. It is generally wiser in structuring private
transactions to follow a time-tested path rather than to try to create some
unique blend that will raise novel questions down the road.
The rules of construction and the rules that set default terms tend on
average to gravitate towards efficient solutions. It is therefore no surprise that
if the rules have a presumptive efficiency about them, other people will on
average tend to begin with these standard relationships for their own work.
At some point, the variations in question could be subject to a form of
codification such as that found in the English Sale of Goods Act of 189312 or
the Uniform Commercial Code that was first promulgated in 1962.13 And you
can also see efforts by private parties to voluntarily incorporate these default
provisions in their own agreements. I have seen many agreements, for
example, that say "any issue that is not explicitly addressed by the terms of
this partnership agreement shall be resolved in accordance with the default
provisions contained in the California partnership statute," which in most
points follows some Uniform Partnership Act.14
In some cases, of course, there is a need to innovate, and in general
the legal system will let parties have the freedom to set out the rules that they
need, which means that parties will start with a given form and then modify
it for their own uses. Thus, instead of either a sale or a lease, there could be
a lease with an option to purchase if certain conditions occur. How then is
this agreement to be classified? This problem first arose in connection with
the forms of action. If there are only leases and sales, in which case does one
put the complex transaction? The choice of the wrong form could drive you
out of court.
Well, we cured that procedural problem by adopting a single form of
action under the federal rules. But it still remains necessary to solve the
substantive issues raised by these intermediate cases. But that is one of the
advantages of a system of freedom of contract. Once the parties decide that
they want to adopt some intermediate form, it's perfectly easy for them to do
so. They draft an agreement that reflects their preferred arrangement. So, it
is possible for them to write: "With the exception of A, B, and C, the
" (1703) 2 Ld. Raymond 909 [913-19] (Eng.); see generallyDAVID IBBETSON, LANDMARK CASES IN

THE LAW OF CONTRACT: CoGGs V.BARNARD (1703) 1-22 (Charles Mitchell & Paul Mitchell eds., 2008).
12 See generally Sale of Goods Act 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71 (Eng.).
" See generally The History of the UCC, LEGALINC (May 19,2018), https://legalinc.com/blog/the-hist
ory-of-the-ucc/.
"4See, e.g., Melissa C. Marsh, What a Well Written PartnershipAgreement Should Include, L. OFF.
OF MELISSA C. MARSH (Mar. 2009), https://www.yourlegalcomer.com/articles.asp?id=24; California
Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.upcounsel.com/califomia-revised-uniformpartnership-act (last visited June 15, 2020).
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relationship here is that of an independent contractor, or with the exception of
D, E, and F, the relationship here is one of an employment relationship." The
judges, in general, will, and surely should, accept their private purposes so
that the process of implication is done in a way that is intended, on average,
to respect the joint intentions of the parties as manifested in the words that
they chose to adopt. At this point, it becomes possible to observe competition
between firms in finding the optimal ways in which to structure their
relationships. That heterogeneity will expand the potential reach of the
market in entirely benign ways.
Now, there is an exception to this general rule that involves the
problem of externalities, which could arise when an employee is engaged in
activities, like driving an automobile that harms a third party. There is now a
real danger that could arise if the parties seek to characterize the relationship
in ways that allow the employer to avoid the application of the rules of
vicarious liability. 5 So, in those cases, the labels that parties put on a
transaction are not going to be decisive if they compromise the rights of third
parties. 6 Hence, the courts must dig beneath the surface to see if that
purported independent relationship comports with the actual control that the
employer operates over the employer. 7
But, on the other hand, there's also a relatively simple solution to the
problem of potential tort liability. Both parties have to recognize the need to
protect the stranger, so together they acquire a joint insurance policy that
protects both parties to the extent of their interests. The third party is thus
fully protected, and then in a separate proceeding the two could resolve any
question of apportionment that arises between them. So, by using insurance,
it is possible to create a clean separation between internal relationships from
the external ones, which preserves freedom of contract where it is really
needed-namely in governing the relationships between the parties. It is a
system that creates a separate pool of assets for tort creditors to look-a pool
that cannot be compromised by the business relationships that the parties have
with any and all voluntary creditors.
At this point, we are now in a position to see why the characterization
question presents novel challenges in dealing with key statutes like the
National Labor Relations Act or the Fair Labor Standards Act. 8 The
application of these statutes precludes the simple solution for all these cases.
Thus, in the ideal world, Uber could enter into a contract that reads simply:
"It is understood by virtue of this contract that the employee who drives the
5 See How Do Courts Decide Between an Independent Contractor and an Employee?, LAWINFO
BLOG (June 28, 2011), https://blog.lawinfo.com/2011/06/28ihow-do-ourts-decide-between-an-indepen
dent-contractor-and-an-employee/.
16 Id
17 Id.

"8See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69, 201-19 (2006).
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car is an independent contractor and not an employee of the Uber
Corporation." But the various labor statutes are not freedom of contract
arrangements. They apply to employees, but they do not apply to independent
contractors. 9 If the parties, by agreement, could decide to put themselves
into the independent contract category, the statute is a dead letter. Employers
would agree to hire, as they could at common law, only those workers who
accepted the independent contractor status and thus waived all the protections
that these statute sought to confer on them, including the right to receive
minimum wages and overtime, to join a union, to receive worker's
compensation benefits and unemployment insurance, and to receive paid
family and sick leave.2"
So, the current legal system offers no employer the contractual
freedom to opt out of these statutes, and hence gives at most a presumptive
legitimacy to the private designation. Indeed, even that outcome is unlikely.
The explicit premise of the labor statutes is that the government must
intervene to prevent employer domination of the overall situation, so that it is
far more likely that the initial presumption will be set in the opposite direction.
The employer cannot rely on a contract whose terms he was able to dictate.
Hence, the likely presumption is that the contract should not be read to mean
what it says. It should, if anything, mean the opposite so that this worker
becomes an employer.
Nonetheless, as an economic matter, the opposite truth is likely. If
these added benefits were in the mutual interests of the two parties, they could
write them into their agreements even if there were no NLRA or FLSA.2 1 The
correct conclusion to draw is that these benefits, at least in the form that they
are provided by law, cost more than they are worth. At this point, we should
see, at least in some cases, systematic efforts by both sides to undercut the
arrangement by mixing and matching terms in the hopes to persuade some
administrator or court that the relationship falls on the independent contractor
side of the line, even though both sides know that as a business matter the
deal will be more effective if it could be structured as a straight,
unencumbered, employment relationship. So, parties will not only hire their
workers as independent contractors, but they will give them just as much
freedom as is needed to make that relationship stick. And that is the pattern
that is observed with various part-time workers in a variety of tech and
business relationships.
Nonetheless, the underlying relationship may make the independent
contractor relationship make sense. Thus, it is quite clear that in dealing with
Uber and Lyft and similar services, the hour-which is the official unit of
19Id

20 See generally id.
21 See generally id.
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exchange under the FLSA-makes no business sense for either side in dealing
with off-premise operations where it is exceedingly difficult for a tech
company to monitor, and for a driver to record, the time spent on any
particularjob. It is therefore in the interest of both sides to switch from time
to trip to measure compensation. Once that is done, it is now possible to
introduce flexible arrangements where drivers can take, or at least bid, on a
given trip. So the workforce is now open to part-time relationships that are
not possible when the hour is the unit of exchange. As with most of these
developments, the expansion of this type of arrangement increases the gains
to both parties.
The tragedy here is that these novel business models that are the
strength of the private law become interesting cases under the FLSA.22 Some
courts will stress the flexibility and accept the contractual solutions. But other
courts will note that the key definitions of an independent contractor
emphasize the freedom from control of the employer on key decisions on
which jobs to take and how to discharge them. 2 ' Those definitions were
applied in cases where there were no network effects.2 4 But once there are,
then the blended contractual solution has to allow the technology to address
the condition of cars and the behavior of the drivers in order to prevent brand
deterioration, which can be deadly in a business whose forte is matching
random passengers with random drivers. In addition, it is equally important
to make sure that all drivers operate on a level platform, which means that the
platform must set rules about how to bid and cancel on jobs. That question,
in turn, raises the issue about how much information can be released to a
driver while making the bid. There is no reason to think that the actual
destination should be told. Certainly, that information is not supplied to hail
cabs who pick up rides, and there is a danger that if too much information is
given out, customers may not be able to get the uniform service they crave.
Hence, the business success of the platform depends on the mix between
control and flexibility, which is just what the current arrangements try to
achieve.
It is at just this juncture that the prized attribute of the private lawnamely, the ability to take two extreme forms and then to mix and match them
and to combine them to any intermediate position-becomes a potential
Achilles heel. The ever-present risk is that the closer the chosen mix gets to
that wavy line between an employee and an independent contractor, the more
difficult and more uncertain it is whether the arrangement will fall on the
wrong side of some line that makes no sense in the first place. Now blended
cases are not the height of contractual ingenuity. They are the source of
regulatory vulnerability. What in contracts are incremental adjustments, now
22Id. §§ 201-19.
23 See, e.g., Johnson v. Berkofsky-Barret Prods, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1067, 1072 (1989).
24 Id
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become the source of sharp discontinuities, which arise under the various
"balancing tests" that are used to solve a statutory problem of how to treat the
intermediate case.
Here is one illustration. In Donovan v. DialAmerica Marketing,Inc.,
the court used this six-part test to determine the status of the defendant's
drivers:
(1) the degree of the alleged employer's right to control the
manner in which the work is to be performed;
(2) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit or loss
depending upon his managerial skill;
(3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or
materials required for his task, or his employment of helpers;
(4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill;
(5) the degree of permanence of the working relationship;
and
(6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the
25
alleged employer's business.
Indeterminate at best, and pointless at worst. But the key point here
is to recognize that this difficulty cannot be cured by massaging the elements
of these various components, for the substitute test will have the same flaccid
list of factors as the one it displaced. In all these cases, there will never be a
single factor that operates as a litmus test to solve this problem. In the end, it
is an invitation for broad judicial discretion or case-by-case analysis, where
the discontinuity remains: go a step too far and you are an employee with all
the burdens that status entails. But is it possible to get a class basis test? In
principle, yes, but not if one looks at the infinite variations observed in the
field. That variety is a plus in a world of free contract because there is no cliff
over which individual cases can fall. But in a regulatory world, the
discontinuities dominate everything else, so that when a legislature tries to fix
the mess, it will be a great political struggle, which in cases like California,
will gravitate heavily toward the favored regulatory approach, without
disavowing the case-by-case approach.2 6 And why? Because the profound
suspicion of market behavior in labor markets continues to dominate today.
But move to the Second Circuit, for example, and the chances of getting the
' 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985).
21 Indeed, this is just what happened in California after this panel. The case that pushed all these cases
to the employee side of the line was Dynamex Operations W. v. Super. Ct., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). The
case was extended by Assembly Bill 5, Ch. 296, in 2019, to cover large swaths of the economy, subject to
many exemptions. See generally A.B. 5, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). For my critique, see Richard
A. Epstein, CaliforniaKnifes the Gig Economy, DEFINING IDEAS (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.hoover
.org/research/califomia-knifes-gig-economy.
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coveted independent status are so much greater.2 7
This joint control problem carries over to other areas. Under the
Obama Administration, there was a concerted effort to classify workers at
franchise restaurants like McDonald's as though they were the joint
employees of the franchisor and the franchisee. 28 Once again, the issue is of
epic importance because the entire business model, as with tech companies,
depends critically on keeping a level of separation between the franchisor and
the employee, which was traditionally recognized in National Labor
Relations Boardv. Browning-Ferris.29 The franchisee knows the local labor
market has the power to hire and fire, subject of course to all the general rules
under the FLSA and the NLRB.3" The franchisee also has to put his or her
own capital at risk in order to have the correct incentives on running the
business. But at the same time, the issues of brand preservation also matter
and those can only be satisfied by having the franchisor impose quality
standards on food, service, and d6cor that give customers the confidence that
when they go into one McDonald's, say, they will get the same quality of
experience that they get anywhere else.
The joint employer requirement kills this model, for no franchisor can
run the risk that it will be hit with massive fines for labor law violations from
operations that it cannot control. So, there will be great pressure to switch to
a control model that squeezes out the franchisees, thereby taking away
opportunities for thousands of individuals from all walks of life to run a
business of their own. The same result will, of course, happen in
transportation markets, for the only way that firms could avoid crushing
penalties is to strip drivers of their options and force them to work standard
shifts, which in the end will sap the overall efficiency of the business. There
is the making of a great tragedy in these developments, as the labor laws
become the most regressive force in the economy. Perhaps unions will rejoice
at the opportunity of expanding their membership rolls. But everyone else
should weep.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Alright. We can get back on
track. Mr. Miscimarra. Our next two speakers are going to talk about, in part,
the 2015 decision in Browning-Ferris where the NLRB expanded the
defimition ofjoint employment.31 Phil, you want to take us through that?
HON. PHILIP MISCIMARRA: It is great being here. I recognize

27 See, e.g., Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 149 (2017).
28 See, e.g, David Gurnick, Franchise 101: Recent "Franchisoras Joint Employer" Developments,

LEwrwr HACKMAN (Nov. 2016), https://www.lewitthackman.com/franchise-101-recent-franchisor-as-joi

nt-employer-developments/.
29 691 F.2d 1117, 1122-24 (3rd Cir. 1982).
30 See generally29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69, 201-19 (2006).
31 See generally Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1124.
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many friends in the audience, including NLRB member William Emanuel.32
Also, it is an honor to be here with Judge Tymkovich. And I am here with
my friends, Professor Epstein and former NLRB General Counsel, Dick
Griffim, although I suspect that Dick and I have different views when it comes
to joint-employer status, particularly the NLRB standard governing jointemployer status.
The title of this session suggests that joint employment involves an
unintended and unpredictable employment relationship. I agree with both of
those characterizations. I will start out with a little bit of background, and
then I will make three points regarding the expanded joint-employer
definition that has become the standard under National Labor Relations Board
law.
By way of background, when you talk about laws governing
employment, nothing is more fundamental than determining who is an
employer and who is an employee.
For many decades, the laws governing employment recognized some
situations where two different employer entities might jointly determine the
wages, benefits, or working conditions for certain individuals.33 In this
situation, the law would sometimes consider both entities, collectively, to be
a joint employer of the employees.34 Until 2015, the concept of jointemployer status was relatively unusual, and it was something that most people
almost never encountered. For example, before I was appointed to the
National Labor Relations Board in 2013, I had been an attorney practicing
labor and employment law in private practice for thirty years, and I never had
a client that had been deemed to be part of a joint-employer relationship.
But in 2015, the National Labor Relations Board decided a case called
Board substantially expanded
Browning-FerrisIndustries,or BF1.35 And the
36
ways.
different
three
in
status
joint-employer
Expansion number one: in BFI, the Board majority held that two
entities would be joint-employers, even if they never exercisedjoint control
over one another's employees. 37 In this respect, the Board in BFI held that
two or more entities could be joint employers based on vendor contracts or
other documents indicating that one party had a "reserved" or potentialright

32

William J. Emauel, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/

board/william-j-emanuel (last visited June 15, 2020).
33 Celine McNicholas & Marni von Wilpert, The Joint Employer Standard and the National Labor
Relations Board, ECON. POL'Y INST. (May 31, 2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-joint-employerstandard-and-te-national-labor-relations-board-what-is-at-stake-for-workers/.
34 Id
3' 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, *1.

3 See generally id. at *81-91.
37 Id

at *72.
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to control employment matters relating to the other party's employees.38
Expansion number two: in BFI, the Board majority held that this
never-exercised joint control (i.e., one that was reserved in vendor contracts
or agreements) could result in joint-employer status even if it only had an
indirect impact on employment matters.39 In previous cases, the NLRB had
indicated that joint-employer status would not40arise unless there was direct
joint control over essential employment terms.
Expansion number three: in BFI, the Board also held that two entities
could be joint employers, even if their potential joint control (which, again,
could be never-exercised, reserved, and only indirect) involved employment
matters that were limited and routine.41 Prior cases generally held that two
entities would not be joint employers based merely on joint control involving
limited and routine employment matters.42
In the interest of full disclosure, I dissented from this expanded
concept ofjoint-employer status in Browning-FerrisIndustries.43 In my BFI
dissent, which was jointly authored with former NLRB member Harry
Johnson, who is also now one of my current partners, we indicated: "No
bargaining table is big enough to seat all of the entities that will be potential
joint employers under the majority's new standard. 44 We also expressed our
view that the expansion in joint-employer status exceeded the Board's
authority under the National Labor Relations Act.45 For example, the NLRA
has important "secondary boycott" provisions-based on amendments
adopted in 1947 and 1959-that were intended by Congress to prevent
multiple businesses from being enmeshed in one another's labor disputes
merely because they do business with one another. 46 The NLRB does not
have authority to effectively repeal these provisions in the NLRA, which is
one of the consequences of the BFI majority decision. In this regard, our BFI
dissent makes the self-evident observation that "[t]he Board is not
Congress.

47

From my perspective, the expansion of "joint employer" status in BFI
causes an array of problems. I will make three points in particular.
First, the expanded NLRB joint-employer standard

38

is truly

Id.at *62.

SId.at *76.
4 See, e.g., TLI, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. No. 798, *799 (July 31, 1984).
4' Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., 362 N.L.R.B. at *72.
42 See, e.g., TLI, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. at *799.

4 362 N.L.R.B. at *96 (Miscimarra, J., dissenting).
Ild at*96, 98.
45 Id.at*] 22.
4 Thomas C. Kohler, National Labor Relations Act (1935), ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyc

lopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/law/law/national-labor-relations-act
4' 362 N.L.R.B. at *209.

(last updated Oct. 8, 2019).
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unpredictable. This is illustrated by one case, CNNAmerica, Inc. 48 In that
case, CNN had a twenty-year history of using two vendors who supplied
technical personnel to CNN in New York and Washington, D.C. 49 These
technical personnel were camera operators, audio technicians, and
engineers. 51 Over the twenty-year history when CNN used the technical
personnel supplied by the two vendors, everybody regarded the vendors as
the "employer."'', In fact, each vendor was unionized, and the collective
bargaining agreements also recognized each vendor as the "employer."52
Additionally, there were NLRB proceedings over the twenty-year period, and
the NLRB recognized the vendors as the "employer., 53 After twenty years,
however, CNN decided to discontinue its vendor relationships and to bring
this technical work in-house.54 The NLRB majority decided, over my
dissenting opinion, that CNN was a "joint-employer" over the technical
personnel.55 Therefore, according to the Board majority, CNN had a legal
obligation to provide notice and the opportunity for bargaining-with the two
vendors' unions-before CNN could decide to discontinue its commercial
relationship with the two vendors.56
I dissented in CNN based, in part, on the twenty-year history when
everybody, including the NLRB, only regarded the vendors as the
"employer," and I stated that "' [e]mployer' status does not arise as the result
of spontaneous combustion."57 I believe the Board's majority conclusion that
CNN was a "joint-employer" came as a surprise, not only to CNN, but also to
the vendors' unions and to the technical employees who previously had
recognized only the vendors as the "employer." 58 On review, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in CNN denied enforcement and remanded the
Board's "joint-employer" determination back to the NLRB, based on
confusion about what 'joint-employer" standard had been applied.59
According to the court of appeals, the NLRB majority in CNN "applied a
[joint-employer] standard . . . that appears to be inconsistent with its
precedents, without addressing those precedents or explaining why they do
not govem." 6 These are outcomes that nobody could have reasonably
predicted.

" See generally 361 N.L.R.B. No. 47, *439 (2014), enforcement denied in part and remanded, 865
F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
49 Id at *439.
50 Id at *486.
"' Id at *476.

Id. at *439, *468.
" See id. at *466-67, *473-74, *480.
5 Id at *439.
" Id at *568.
56 Id at *475-76.
17 Id at *476.
'8 Id at *562.
59 NLRB v. CNN Am., Inc., 865 F.3d 740, 748 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
60 Id
52
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Second, the NLRB, and other agencies and courts, in my view, do not
have the resources necessary to adjudicate all of the situations where different
clients, customers, vendors, suppliers, franchisors, and/or franchisees might
be "joint-employers" under the expanded joint-employer standard adopted by
the NLRB in Browning-FerrisIndustries.61 Again pointing to CNN, I would
point out that the dispute only involved three entities (CNN and the two
vendors), and two locations (encompassing CNN's operations in New York
and Washington, D.C.).62 However, the litigation required 82 hearing days
before an administrative law judge, which produced a transcript that exceeded
16,000 pages, with more than 1,300 exhibits in the case. 63 Similarly, in a
highly-publicized NLRB case involving joint employer claims against
McDonald's USA and roughly thirty McDonald's franchisees, there were
more than 150 hearing days before an administrative law judge, and the case
remains pending.' 4
Third, I have some sympathy regarding certain considerations relied
upon by my former NLRB colleagues when they expanded the 'jointemployer" standard in Browning-Ferris Industries.65
We live in a
complicated economy. One can understand the desire for "simpler times" if
this could insulate wages and benefits from the competitive pressures imposed
on employers by clients, customers, vendors, and consumers. But this type
of economy has not existed in the United States for more than 200 years, and
one can make the case that such "simpler times" have never existed. Our
global economy is characterized by many different types of business
interrelationships. Our economy also involves a great deal of specialization.
Everybody, including hard-working employees throughout the United States,
has benefited from the economic growth and development that we have seen
in recent years.
It is also important, in this complex economy, to have some
reasonable certainty regarding who is the "employer" and who are
"employees." Employers, employees, and unions should have the ability to
determine this for themselves, without requiring years of litigation before the
National Labor Relations Board and the courts. I believe this is impossible
under the current, expanded definition of "joint-employer" status that was
developed by the NLRB in Browning-FerrisIndustries.6 6 Most recently, in

September 2018, the NLRB proposed new regulations which, if adopted,
would reinstate the pre-BFI"joint-employer" standards by indicating that two
or more entities could be joint employers only if they "possess and actually
exercise substantial direct and immediate control over employees' essential
See 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, *1 (Aug. 27, 2015).
62 See 865 F.3d at 746.
63 UPMC, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 153, *1 (Dec. 11,2017).
61

A Id.
65 See generally 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, * 1 (Aug. 27, 2015).

' See generally id.
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terms and conditions of employment in a manner that is not limited and
routine," with multiple examples illustrating the proper application of this
standard.67 Everyone would benefit from greater certainty and more restraint
in this important area. Thank you.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Let's hear from Dick Griffim.
RICHARD GRIFFIN, JR.: So in light of my complete, and utter,
and total disagreement with almost everything said by the two predecessors,
it's a little difficult for me to determine how to order my remarks, but I'm
going to try and do a little bit of a seriatim review and rebuttal. The first thing
is I was very interested to hear Professor Epstein's discussion about how the
common law got this right and the administrative agencies and the statutes
got it wrong. And part of the reason that that's interesting to me is because
the lead case on employee status, under the National Labor Relations Act,
that was decided by the Supreme Court involving the
originally, was a case
68
Hearst Corporation.
And that was a case that involved newspaper-they called them
newsies or newsboys, although they were, for the most part, older people not
boys.69 The question was whether or not those folks were employees of the
Hearst Corporation.7" And the Board, with approval from the Supreme Court,
said using what the Supreme Court called an economic realities test, that they
were employees.71 And you had to look to the purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act, what policies it was trying to promote, when you interpreted
whether or not these people were employees because the question of whether
or not they were employees-what turned on that status was whether or not
they had the protections of the National Labor Relations Act and could engage
in certain types of activity without being discharged or disciplined.72
And in response to that-and Phil is one of the great proponents of
this point, and I was a little surprised that he didn't emphasize it in his remarks
because I've heard him emphasize it many times before, and I am in complete
agreement with him on this point-in response to that, the Congress in 1947,
as part of the Taft-Hartley Act, excluded specifically independent contractors
from the definition of employee under the National Labor Relations Act, and
specifically said the Board had to, in doing so, that the Board had to apply a
common law test.73 So the test that the Board is supposed to be applying is,

in fact, the common law test developed over the years and, in fact, sort of
67 Joint Employers, 83 Fed. Reg. 46,681, 46,696-97 (Sept. 14, 2018) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt.
103).

1 See generallyNLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
69 Id at 114.
70

Id at 113.

7, See id. at 134-35.
72 Id at 125-27.
71 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 142(3), 152(3) (2006).
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accumulated in the Restatement of Agency.74 And so the fight actually in
Browning-Ferris,the case that Phil described, is actually a fight between the
majority and the dissent, about what you can look at under the common law
to make a decision about whether somebody is an employee or not.75
And the fact is that the Restatement ofAgency talks about the right of
control.
And implicit in the right of control and explicit in the various
aspects of the Restatement ofAgency's discussion of the right of control isthere will be times when an entity has control that it has not exercised, but it
has a right to exercise, and that right to exercise control under the Restatement
77
ofAgency is sufficient to establish an employment relationship.
76

Before, many years ago in the earlier days of the Board, there were a
number of cases where there was a contract between one entity and another
entity. And there's no question that the contractor employed the employees,
but the other entity that retained the contractor retained within the contract the
control to determine wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment.78
And it's that type of right of control, if nonetheless
unexercised, that the Board majority in Browning-Ferrissaid is one factor to
take into account. 79
So, I think, there isn't such a large difference between the courts
interpreting the factors under the common law and the agency, in terms of
what the standard is supposed to be. The one thing about the National Labor
Relations Act, that was the reason for its adoption in the first place, was a
recognition that employment contracts between a company and an individual
employee are not agreements where there is an equivalency of bargaining
power on both sides of the equation, where the nature of the relationship can
be reordered so nicely, as described by Professor Epstein."0 In fact, in the
preamble to the National Labor Relations Act, it is a specific Congressional
purpose for its adoption recognition of the results-the adverse results-that
that inequality of bargaining power had led to in the national economy of the
1930's.8'
Second point, with respect to the McDonald's litigation. In each of
the pieces of litigation that were mentioned, there were a few things that were
left out that I think are important for understanding context. I'll actually get
to McDonald's third. Phil mentioned the CNN case, and I'll just make two

74 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
71 See 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, *1 (Aug. 27, 2015).
76 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW AGENCY § 1.01.

77 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW AGENCY § 1.01, comt. c.

7 See, e.g., Greyhound Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 1488, 1495 (1965); Franklin Simon & Co., 94 N.L.R.B.
576, *579 (1951).
7 362 N.L.R.B. at *68-70.
0 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
XI 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
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points about the CNN case.82 CNN was found, including by Phil in his
capacity as a Board member, to have seriously violated the National Labor
Relations Act because when they terminated those vendors, they decided to
take the work in-house and specifically determined not to hire any of the
people who had been doing work for them for twenty years through the
vendors-specifically decided not to hire those people, or a certain number
of those people, because if they did they would have had a successor
bargaining obligation with respect to the unions that represented those folks.83
And so they hatched a scheme whereby they hired a certain number of people,
but stayed underneath the fifty percent number plus one that would make them
represented these
obligated to bargain with the union that had historically
84
vendors.
the
through
work
this
doing
individuals
So much of the litigation in the CNN case involved subpoena
enforcement fights over the documents that described the hiring scheme.85
And that part of the decision is not, I don't think, at issue. There was a
violation with respect to CNN. 86 There was an issue, and Phil is quite right,
about the joint employment aspect of it, but to attribute the length of the
litigation, the number of pages of documents, the length of the hearing, to
attribute it to the joint-employer issue, I think is frankly not an accurate
characterization of the litigation.
Second point-and it should be noted-that the CNN decision was a
joint-employer decision that came before Browning-Ferris that ostensibly
applied the prior standard that Phil would like the Board to go back to, but it
included some of the factors that ultimately ended up in the Browning-Ferris
decision. 87 And the D.C. Circuit said, "Hey, if you're going to revise the
standard you've got to be explicit about it. You can't do it sub silencio."88
And so that's why the case came back, and it's in fact in mediation as we
speak.89
The second case that I'd like to mention is Browning-Ferris.9 I just
want to make one point about Browning-Ferris,and that has to do with what
the people were actually doing in the case. Browning-Ferris runs a waste
recycling center.9" Browning-Ferris has quite a few employees of its own
who are represented by a union.92 And Browning-Ferris used a temporary
agency to supply them with a large number of people whose job was to sort
82 361 N.L.R.B. No. 47, *439 (Sept. 15, 2014).
83
84

Id.at*570-71.
Id at *447.

85 See id. at *440.

Id at *439.
362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, *1 (Aug. 27, 2015).
8 See id.;
8 CNN, 865 F.3d at 764.
89 See CNN,NABET-CWA, http://www.nabet31.org/node/32 (last visited June 15, 2020).
90 362 N.L.R.B. at *672.
9' Id.at *9.
at *10.
92 See id.
16

2020]

Joint Employment

recyclables on a conveyor belt.9 3 Okay? And these people were essentially
perma-temps.94 They were not there for two or three days. They were there
for extended periods of time, working on the Browning-Ferris property, under
95
the supervision of Browning-Ferris, doing Browning-Ferris work.
A union sought to represent these people and filed a petition with the
NLRB for an election to represent these temporary agency employees
working at Browning-Ferris, and named the temporary agency as an
employer, but also named Browning-Ferris as a joint-employer.96 What
happens when you have an NLRB election, if the union wins and the employer
has an obligation to bargain with the union over wages, hours, terms and
conditions of employment, and the end result of that, if things work out well,
is there's a collective bargaining agreement that covers wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment. 97 And one of the primary things that is
grist for the mill of collective bargaining is a disciplinary procedure.
So put yourself in the position of the individual employee working on
that conveyor belt, sorting the recyclables, and supervised by BrowningFerris supervisors. And assume for purposes of discussion, that you screw up
and you are told to leave the property. You will not be allowed back on the
property by a Browning-Ferris supervisor. You think what you did is a
relatively minor-league thing. Maybe you should be suspended for a day.
Maybe you should get a warning. You should not be fired from a job that
you've had for fourteen months or more.
If the collective bargaining agreement where you voted for a union to
represent you is just with the temporary agency, what can the temporary
agency do about that? They can't reinstate you to the line. They can't talk to
Browning-Ferris to try and work something out to lessen your level of
discipline. You need Browning-Ferris to be at the table because BrowningFerris is controlling that aspect of your employment. So the concept ofjointemployer and the Browning-Ferrisdecision is that if there are two entities
that share or co-determine your essential terms and conditions of
employment, they should both be at the bargaining table.
It has been stated that this is too complicated. How are you going to
ever negotiate a contract with two people on the other side? Browning-Ferris
is an incredibly successful large corporation--one minute. Oh, well, I guess
I'll speed up, so I won't get to my third point which was to rebut the
McDonald's problem. Browning-Ferris is a very large, very successful
corporation, deals with multiple suppliers, engages in complex business
9' id at *11 12.
9' See id. at *82-85.
9' See id. at *85-89.
% See id. at* 1.
9
. See generally Conduct Elections, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/

what-we-do/conduct-elections (last visited June 15, 2020).
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transactions. 98 The notion that once they sit down at the bargaining table with
a temporary agency next to them, they can't walk and chew gum at the same
time, strikes me as underestimating the sophisticated nature of the BrowningFerris corporate enterprise. And I'll end on that note.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Thank you, Dick. I guess since
you went last that would make you the appellee in my court, which means
you would have won below and so I guess I'll give Phil a little bit of rebuttal.
And as part of your rebuttal, could you give us what the current status of the
BFIcase is, and the joint-employer issue before the NLRB?
HON. PHILIP MISCIMARRA: With respect to the points that
Dick made, I will only say two or three things. As a technical point, in the
CNN case, there were a number of findings of the Board majority that I
happened to agree with. I agreed that CNN was a successor employer, and I
also agreed there were some individual hiring decisions that constituted
unlawful, anti-union discrimination. But I dissented from the NLRB finding
that CNN pursued an overall plan or scheme to engage in discriminatory
hiring based on a desire to defeat a finding of successorship. On appeal,
Circuit Judge Kavanaugh-who is now Supreme Court Justice Kavanaughagreed with my dissenting opinion that CNN did not engage in an overall plan
or scheme to engage in discriminatory hiring. But Dick is correct that some
aspects of the CNN case involved other issues, and I agreed with some of
them. But I strongly disagreed-strongly-with the finding of jointemployer status.
Also, although CNN involved more than the question of whether
CNN and its vendors were joint-employers, every case that addresses alleged
joint-employer status will also involve additional alleged violations. Jointemployer status, standing alone, is not unlawful. Part of the problem in these
cases, from my perspective, is that the merits of underlying substantive claims
gets obscured, to a significant degree, by requiring extensive additional
litigation over what should already be clear, which is the identity of the
"employer." For example, in the McDonald's litigation, the entire case was
structured in a manner that placed the question ofjoint-employer liability first,
before the introduction of evidence regarding whether any party committed
substantive violations of the Act.
As to the current status of Browning-FerrisIndustries, the case has
gone back and forth a little bit between the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit and the NLRB, but it remains pending in the Court of Appeals for the

See generally David Barboza & Laura M. Holson, The Markets: Market Place; A Trash Hauler is
Buying Much Bigger Rival, a Type of Deal that Makes Wall Street a Bit Nervous, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9,
1999), https://www.nytimes.com/I999/03/09/business/markets-market-place-trash-hauler-buying-much-b
igger-rival-type-deal-that-makes.htmil.
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D.C. Circuit. 99 Again, the Board in the interim has issued a proposed
regulation regarding the proper standard to apply in joint-employer cases,
which would effectively reinstate the "joint-employer" standard that existed
before BF[ was decided. 00
HON. TIMOTHY TYMIKOVICH: You played no role in the
Browning-Ferrislitigation, but is there some consistency with the BrowningFerrisapproach and your common law notion?
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Oh, yes. I have two things to comment on.
First of all, I think Dick is one hundred percent wrong to say that what the
agencies did was to simply incorporate common law tests in the statute.
Remember the common law had a freedom of contract override which would
allow people to figure out these intermediate cases in whichever way they
wanted to do, except to the extent that there were third-party issues for which
the insurance was the coverage. And you don't have that degree of flexibility.
And so what the Supreme Court does in NLRB v. Hearst Publications by
calling these newsboys employees is to upset the business model, and then
invite an uncertain statutory override. None of this would happen in the
contractual world. So I will continue to make the point that to use any of
these tests to override voluntary arrangements between the parties, the effort
will always be a failure.
The second point I want to make is there is no dumber statute, no
more ignorant set of preambles, than those you find in the National Labor
Relations Act of 1937.1 The proposition that a serious academic discussion
should take as a given that there is inequality of bargaining power between
unions and workers, without any demonstration of that fact, strikes me as one
of the fatal conceits of the New Deal. If you look at wage patterns before the
passage of the NLRA, they are quite consistent. Wages move up consistently
with productivity because employers, wholly without the benefit of the union,
bid up wages in order to get the services they need.
If you start treating inequality of bargaining power as a serious
conception, you never come up with contractual equilibrium because it means
every time it turns out that the employer says at every juncture, "Well, I've
got inequality of bargaining power. You can't get that. So you will accept
wages down to zero." That doesn't happen. What happens is that these
employers need these workers as much as these workers need their employers.

" The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a divided decision in Browning-FerrisIndustries
on December 28, 2018. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The
court majority upheld the Board majority's holding that joint employer status could be based in part on
reserved and indirect joint control, but the majority remanded the case based on the Board majority's
application of this standard and the failure to adequately explain certain aspects of it; Senior Circuit Judge
Randolph dissented, in reliance on the BFI dissenting opinion. Id. at 1222-23, 1227.
'oo Id at 1206.
o1 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
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And in terms of wage increases in the period between say 1870 and 1935, it's
the greatest advance in the condition of the working man in the United States
that we've ever seen.
And it's only the misguided "genius" of the New Deal that basically
takes the competitive market, treats it as though it's a form of oppression, and
announces that it's a failure. It then puts into place a system, which is so rigid.
What labor markets need is flexibility. What the rules on successor liability
do is to make sure that the only way a firm can get itself out of a losing
transaction is to make a deal with a union which has veto power, given the
bilateral monopoly created under the NLRA. There is no greater systematic
set of inefficiencies than those associated with the National Labor Relations
Act.
So my question to Dick quite simply is how in his view should we
choose a social method of allocation for labor markets? Given any fixed
amount of resources we spend on this task, what improvement in output do
we create by putting into place a system of rigidity? We lose two ways under
the National Labor Relations Act. It costs a fortune to administer a statute
that always comes out with the wrong result. I fail to see why we should
genuflect to a preamble to a labor statute that was put together by union
supporters in 1935, and thereby embrace a theory of industrial organization
contained in2 a set of congressional findings that are simply of unmatched
10
ignorance.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Before I openRICHARD GRIFFIN, JR.: Could I respond to that?
HON. TIMOTHY TYMiKOVICH: I'll open up to the audience in
a minute, but I'll let Dick get the last word.
RICHARD GRIFFIN, JR.: Not to put too fine a point on it, but this
country teetered on the brink in the middle of the 1930's. There was mass
unemployment. There were-in order to come up with the aforementioned
language of the preamble-Senator La Follette held a series of hearings about
the bases for the economic situation of the country that lasted over an
extended period of time, and is frankly fairly unmatched in Congressional
history. °3 And I just couldn't disagree with you more. And ifI may finish,
I didn't interrupt you, the notion that the labor market is efficient and that
wages rise with productivity is completely belied by the last thirty years of
experience where you have very substantial increases of productivity, not
matched in the least by wage increases. And the statistics on that the

102

See id.

103 See generally Jerold S. Auerbach, The La Follette Committee and the C.0., 48 THE WISC. MAG.
OF His. 3,3 (1964).
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4
empirical evidence on that is fairly irrefutable. 0

HON. TIMOTHY TYMiKOVICH: I like the adversary system
here. Let's go ahead and open up to the audience. We have two mics going
around. Any questions?
QUESTIONER 1: As a non-employment and labor relations
lawyer, I do a lot of commercial real estate and construction. I can't find a
scenario-I was taking notes-in which it would be possible to fully protect
one of my developer clients or myself in development from being held to be
a joint-employer under some of these decisions. But, from a historical
standpoint, to address both of you, the lessons of history are the oppressed
eventually become the oppressors, and we have seen that, I think, go both
ways in the United States. If you take everything into account, employers and
then the unions, in the end there's a lot of balance. But I also have to say that
I agree with Professor Epstein.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Could you repeat the question?

I didn't

quite get it.

HON. TIMOTHY TYMIKOVICH: I think she said she agreed with
you.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Oh. [Laughter]
RICHARD GRIFFIN, JR.: Take yes for an answer.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: I always do. I'll be silent.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Let's see. There's a couple
back there.
QUESTIONER 2: Thank you. Good afternoon. Thanks for
coming. I'm actually an employment lawyer, one of the many Federalist
Society members who actually represents The Federalist Society, but
anyways. I have a question regarding the joint employment. This is
specifically for Professor Epstein. This is a hypothetical dealing with one of
my cases currently pending before an agency. So, you have an agency official
who touches the breast of an employee who's hired by a defense contractor.
How does that change the analysis as far as-I'm not sure I understood the
insurance analysis-but how does that inform you as far as whether or not
that should be considered a joint employment relationship where you've got
a private contractor providing an employee to work directly for the federal
government agency. She reports the bad behavior of the government person
to her boss and then gets fired.
"' See generally Drew Desilver, ForMost U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely Budged in Decades,

PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/07/for-most-us-workersreal-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/.
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RICHARD EPSTEIN: I'm not quite sure what the particulars are,
but let me give a general answer, which I think that goes with what Phil said
earlier on. If you look at a case like Browning-Ferris,and the pre-Obama
Board redefinitions of it, those findings of a joint employment relationship
are fine under the statute.105 It seems to me that what one ought not to do,
however, is to expand the definitions by using all of these indirect tests and
hypothetical control-type cases to situations where historically that test was
never implied. And, I think, it's extremely important to understand that if you
have a set of statutory definitions that are so utterly porous, it is always unwise
to change their content by administrative fiat to mandate some standard that
has never been tested and implied.
I think that's also true with respect to many constitutional questions.
Accumulated practice gets a very heavy nod in its favor. Certainly, the
franchising industry grew mightily under these particular rules."° So, I would
say, I don't comment on individual cases. What I do comment on strongly is
the notion that an administrative agency, which is largely ignorant of the
multiple facts on the ground, should change a rule that has worked well to
something which has never been tried or explicated. I regard that, even within
the administrative state, as a form of reckless behavior. And on this particular
point, the older views on administrative law always respected a consistent and
earlier practice made by those who knew and were familiar with the statute,
to guard against a sudden change of policy later on. That was the 19th century
view, consistently exercised. That is, I think, the correct way to look at these
questions.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Dick.
RICHARD GRIFFIN, JR.: I agree very strongly with that
proposition because the test that the Board moved to in BFI was actually a
reformulation of the test that was applied without full articulation for the basis
from 1935 to 1984. And then in 1984, in a series of cases that I think Phil
would agree formed the basis for the current doctrine that BFIreacted against,
the two main cases, TLIand Laerco. °7 The Board started to say that a number
of factors that it had looked at before were insufficient.' 8 What you needed
to have was direct, immediate, substantial involvement for the putative jointemployer to be held to be the joint-employer. 109 Now, I may be overstating a
little bit, but we've filed a brief before the Board in BFI arguing that they
should return to what we articulated as the traditional test, that 1935 to '84
test. There was not a lot of articulation in those cases, I'm prepared to
105691 F.2d 1117, 1119,1125 (3rd Cir. 1982).
'06 The Rise of the Franchise,REFRESH RENOVATIONS, https://www.refreshfranchiseopportunities.co.
uk/article/the-rise-of-the-franchise/ (last visited June 15, 2020).
"0 See TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.RB. No. 32, *128 (1984); Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. No.
7, *61 (1984).
"o TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. at *798 (1984).
109Id
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concede. But they did look at these other factors that the Board did expand
back in that direction in BFI."o
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Phil, there was actually a
subsequent case, Hy-Brand, that was then vacated."' Are there other cases
that might challenge the Browning-Ferrislogic before the Board?
HON. PHILIP MISCIMARRA: I'm no longer a member of the
National Labor Relations Board, so I don't know what's currently pending
before the agency, but I believe there are other joint-employer cases that are
pending at the NLRB. I should also state that I do not agree with Dick's
characterization of the law preceding Browning-FerrisIndustries.
Also, in the 1950's, the Supreme Court held, in the Denver Building
Trades case, that a construction industry general contractor is not the
employer of its subcontractors' employees, even though in the construction
industry a general contractor obviously exercises control over virtually
everything that goes on at a construction site." 2 So there are some very strong
benchmarks that have been created, not only by Congress, but also by the
Supreme Court. And that is one example where I think longstanding existing
law is incompatible with the BF1 decision decided by the Board majority in
2015."'
RICHARD GRIFFIN, JR.: I'd just like to say one thing because I
didn't really get a chance to address this franchisor/franchisee issue, and I'll
be brief about it. The basis for franchising is, essentially, the ability to license
your trademark. Historically, it was unlawful to license your trademark. That
got changed, and that means that you can now license the trademark. You
have a duty, though, to police the brand and to make sure that the trademark
is not adulterated." 4 In the 1970's, during the Ford administration, the
General Counsel of the Board, John Irving, brought a series of cases against
franchise industry franchisors/franchisees alleging sort of an enterprise
liability theory." 5
And coming out of those cases-including single-employer, jointemployer, there are a bunch of stuff thrown into those cases-but what came
out of those cases was, if what the franchisor is doing is policing the brand,
pursuant to its legal obligation to do so, that engagement with the franchisee
is not a basis for holding the franchisor to be a joint-employer. 1 6 In the
"0 See generally 362 N.L.R.B No. 186, *] (Aug. 27, 2015).
. See 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156, *1 (Dec. 14, 2017).
112341 U.S.C. §§ 675, 689-90 (1951).
"' Press Release, NLRB Off. of Pub. Aff., Board Issues Decision in Browning-Ferris Industries (Aug.
27, 2015), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-issues-decision-browning-ferris-indus
tries.
". Ben Wagner, A Primer on Policing your Trademark, MINTZ, https://www.mintz.com/insights-cent
er/viewpoints/2251/2013-04-primer-policing-your-trademark (last visited June 15, 2020).
"5 See, e.g., Lorenz Schneider Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1975).
116 See, e.g., id. at 451.
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McDonald's case, the General Counsel's complaint and theory of the case
acknowledges that and agrees that that type of activity is insufficient to
convey joint-employer status.' 17 It's going beyond that in your involvement
in the operations of the franchisee that is the basis for the McDonald's case,
and we could spend a lot of time, and I'll stop there.'
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Can I comment on that?
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Yeah, quickly.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Policing the brand is a deceptive term. You
also have to police the quality of the work that comes out underneath the
brand. And that means you have to have some degree of control of the way
in which the product is presented, and prepared, and so forth. So, every single
franchisor, where there's no risk of unionization, has much more
comprehensive control other than that. It seems to me that what you really
want to do is to take your benchmark, not this artificially narrow definition of
what a franchisor does, but off of the standard practices of contracting that
take place when there's no union issue involved. And the McDonald's
contracts don't differ very much from those agreements.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: I think there was another
question over here.
QUESTIONER 3: Yes, Mr. Griffin, you referred to the hiring
practices of CNN with respect to vendor employees to keep those hires down
to not hit a certain statutory level to thereby impose successor coverage. You
referred to that as a scheme. But why would trying to avoid a statutory
number to implicate the application of the statute, why would that be a
scheme?
RICHARD GRIFFIN, JR.: Because if-and let's just talk about it
in the abstract. Ifthe reason you make a hiring decision is based on someone's
support for or non-support for a labor organization, that's a violation of the
National Labor Relations Act.119 And if you are seeking to-if you make a
decision not to hire Sam, not based on Sam's merits, but because if you hire
Sam you will have an obligation to bargain, and you think Sam supports the
union, that's what I'm talking about.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: That is an unfair labor practice and that's
the problem. My basic view is "yellow dog" contracts, which allow an
employer to demand unquestioned and undivided loyalty from all employees,
are essential to free market organization, which is why the National Labor
Relations Act is wrong when it makes sure that every employee now has dual
"' See generallyMcDonald's USA, LLC v. Fast Food Workers Comm., Case No. 02-CA-093893 (July
17, 2018), http://apps.nrb.gov/ink/document.aspx/0903 ld458288067b.
118 Id
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loyalties.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: We have a question on this side
of the room.
QUESTIONER 4 (ROGER): Alright. Thank you. Given the
disputed jurisprudence in this area, I'd like the panel's thoughts on the
desirability and the feasibility of rulemaking to address this problem from a
prospective, and hopeful-thoughtful conclusion format.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMIKOVICH: Phil, do you want to start with
that?
HON. PHILIP MISCIMARRA: The Board obviously has the
authority under the National Labor Relations Act to engage in rulemaking. 120
In fact, in 2014, I participated in rulemaking that produced regulations
relating to the NLRB's election procedures that ran 735 pages. I'm told the
best part of that regulation started on page 494, which is where the dissenting
views of former Members Miscimarra and Johnson started. The Board has
engaged in rulemaking rarely, but it is clearly appropriate. And I think that it
is appropriate for the Board, if it chooses, to engage in the rulemaking that
has commenced regarding the proper joint-employer standard.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Dick.
RICHARD GRIFFIN, JR.: Yeah. As you know, Roger, because
you were involved in the healthcare bargaining unit rulemaking, the Board
has on a couple of occasions abjured its usual establishment of rules through
case-by-case adjudication, and has chosen to engage in rulemaking. 12 ' And I
agree with Phil that there's statutory authority to do it. Whether or not this
particular issue is a good one for rulemaking, I think I disagree with Phil. I
think there's a good argument that the prior law, both the stuff I referred to
pre-1984 and the 1984 up to BFI law-really the basis for the Board's
I think it was very
position-was not very thoroughly articulated.
thoroughly-whether you agree with it or not, the Browning-Ferris decision
on both sides, the majority and the dissent-articulates very thoroughly the
the scope
basis for why the majority believes the rule it adopted was within
22
of the common law and why the dissent finds it not appropriate.'
And that's really the first full articulation of the basis in the history
of the Board on the subject, and it's pending in the D.C. Circuit. 123 So my
view would be, particularly because on questions of common law, the Board
Id. § 156.
Press Release, NLRB Off. of Pub. Aff., NLRB Rulemaking Agenda Announced (May 22, 2019),
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-rulemaking-agenda-announced.
122See generally BFI Newby Island Recyclery, 362 N.L.R.B No. 186, *1 (Aug. 27, 2015).
123 H. Rowan Leathers & Timothy W. Lindsay, D.C. Circuit "Refines" the NLRB's Joint Employer
120
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Test, BUTLER SNOW (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.butlersnow.comi2019/01/d-c-circuit-refines-the-nlrbs-joi

nt-employer-test/.

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:3

is not entitled to really much deference. It's only entitled to, "If there are
equivalent views, defer to otherwise equivalent views." So I would-my own
feeling is-that a Board should wait and see what the D.C. Circuit thinks
about BFI rather than embark on...
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Has there been an increase in
litigation post-BFP
RICHARD GRIFFIN, JR.: No. There are very few cases that
alleged joint employer post-BFI,and there's no indication that there are more
joint-employer allegations post-BFIthan pre-.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: May I make a comment on the general
point? I think that, generally speaking, in a context like this, you do not want
to use rulemaking because you will never come up with a rule that works.
What will happen is you will have a rulemaking process that results in the
following sham type of rule. "Here are the sixteen factors you have to take
into account in order to figure out whether or not somebody is-under this
circumstance is a . . ."-and there will be choices: employer, independent
contractor, employee student, employee intern, and so forth, under this statute
or any other. So I don't see the gain from a process that it's going to take a
long period of time to achieve very little.
I would rather, therefore, that the Board take its position in a public
statement and then litigate. But again, let me be very clear, this problem is
the question of second and third best. The first best is, "I can stipulate my
contract in one paragraph. You will be my employee. You will be my
independent contractor." And we don't need to go through any of this
rigmarole. And the problem of choosing between second and third best only
arises because we completely reject the freedom of contract approach for the
unsound reasons of the La Follette Committee. And when you're trying to
figure out the Depression, it wasn't labor markets that created the mess. It
was monetary deflation and restraints on foreign trade. And you can't cure
those two defects by mucking up the labor rules. And so, the crusade for the
NLRA has been a completely misguided enterprise from the beginning.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: There's a question over here.
HON. PHILIP MISCIMARRA: If I may just make two quick
points and then go to the question. First, the absence of a flood of cases in
litigation regarding joint-employer status, from my perspective, is indicative
of the problem, not the lack of a problem. We have these very broad and
expansive articulated standards that suggest many companies have business
relationships with one another are make them joint-employers. To the extent
that there are only a few isolated cases that litigate these issues, it means this
entire area is populated with arbitrary outcomes regarding what parties are
required to function as "joint-employers" and what parties are not. Most
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companies want to comply with the law, but this is only feasible if parties can
understand what the standards mean without NLRB litigation. Based on the
breadth of the current standard, as I have already indicated, I do not believe
that parties can figure out for themselves who are joint-employers, and who
are not.
Also, I disagree with Richard's description of the rulemaking
because, number one, we don't know where the proposed joint-employer rule
is likely to end up. And, number two, I think, unlike Browning-Ferris
Industries,which adjudicated a particular situation that Dick described in his
own comments, the proposed rule did more than merely articulate a standard
that resembled the state of the law prior to the 2015 BFI case, the proposed
rule also included eleven different examples, and a final rule might even
include more examples. One of the benefits of rulemaking is the possibility
of having an agency address a range of different situations. This can be much
quicker and result in guidance that is much more expansive than what an
agency like the NLRB can accomplish in any single particular case.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Let's get a question.
PEPPER CRUTCHER: Hi. Pepper Crutcher from Mississippi.
Among other things, for about forty years, I've been negotiating labor
contracts, and it's very common that the union and the employer get together
and agree that these perma-temps working here in our organization, they are
not the employer's employees. And there are good, sensible reasons from the
union's point of view why they would agree to that. Is that agreement
between the union and the employer, although it binds people not represented
by the union, is that deserving of a deference from the National Labor
Relations Board? And if it is, why is it?
HON. PHILIP MISCIMARRA: Well, the parties' collective
bargaining agreement did not receive deference in the CNN case because there
was a collective bargaining history that spanned two decades in which the
vendor was the only "employer" named in the collective bargaining
agreements. 124 With respect to what the Board would do if they had a similar
situation prospectively, that would be up to the current members of the NLRB.
I thought that the parties' practice and who the parties, historically, regarded
important consideration, at least from my
as the "employer" was a very
1 25
perspective, in the CNN case.
RICHARD GRIFFIN, JR.: I would agree with that, and I think, for
the most part, when people are excluded pursuant to agreement, that's
something that historically in most situations has been honored. The CNN
case is different in that regard, but I don't think, as a general matter, people
124

CNN Am. Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 47, *446 (2014).
id.
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ought to be concerned about the nature of those type of arrangements. I would
say, just for one second, the Board actually-of the employment statutes, the
definition of the employment relationship under the National Labor Relations
Act, is the narrowest.' 26 The Fair Labor Standards Act, where the definition
held by the Supreme Court
of employ is "suffer or permit to work," has been
127
definition.
to have a broader-than-common-law
And so, when you're thinking from a defensive standpoint, with
respect to how employers should arrange their relationships, and you're
looking at a statute that has a private right of action, that has attorney's fees
for the prevailing party under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and a broader
definition, versus National Labor Relations Act where there's not independent
investigatory authority in the agency, there is no private right of action, and
you have the narrower common law definition, I think from the employer's
standpoint, what they want to be more concerned with, just my own view, is
that the FLSA potential liability is a more likely legal question to arise than
the NLRA issue.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: It's complicated because in areas where
unionization is possible, the NLRA is generally regarded with greater dread,
but in those cases where unionization is not possible, particularly with respect
to the overtime provisions, which do not have a minimum wage associated
128
with them, potential liabilities under the FLSA can become enormous.
And, yes, there are private rights of action.1 29 Indeed, many of the cases
having to do with Uber and interns are all FLSA actions.13 ° Again, my view
is I'm adamantly opposed to all these statutes, but I agree with Dick that the
differences that he makes are really relevant. I don't think it's a uniform rule,
but I do think it's presumptively one that, if you looked at all of America's
employees, the FLSA is probably the more dangerous, particularly since its
definitions are broader and joint control, or joint status in laboratories, and so
forth is very, very common.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: We have time for a couple
more.
QUESTIONER 6: Professor Epstein, you emphasize the
importance of the uniformity of freedom, but I assume that the constituents in
California have different preferences with respect to their labor laws from the
constituents in Texas, for example. Shouldn't companies like Uber be
126 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
127 Id § 203(g); see Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992).
'2 See Overtime Pay, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/overtimepay.htm (last visited
June 15, 2020).
129 See, e.g., Stephen Fox & Jonathan Clark, Uber Drivers' Class Action Lawsuit Hits PermanentRed
Light, LAB. & EMP. LAW BLOG (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com2018/04/art
icles/fair-labor-standards-act-flsa/uber-drivers-class-action-lawsuit/.
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expected to conform their businesses and their practices to the preferences
reflected by those very different citizenries?
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Well, this is not an argument about the
substance. This is an argument about federalism. And I think the answer is,
yes. If there are variations in state law where the federal government doesn't
apply, any national corporation has to be able to comply with what is going
on locally. But the point that I was arguing with respect to the California case
is that they got the wrong definition on the merits, and there was nothing about
the political dynamics in California, which justified a different rule from those
found elsewhere. Perhaps, California is an outlier, but it is a very large state,
so now it's going to be that much more difficult to run one of these nationwide
companies under inconsistent legal regimes.
But, yes. I do agree with federalism, but let me be very clear. In the
morning sessions, and some of these sessions you hear all the wonderful
encomiums with respect to federalism. I regard those as essentially somewhat
optimistic. To me, the real problem is you can get abuses at the federal level,
and you can also get abuses at the state level. And a system of federalism,
which allows each state to go its own way, creates a problem that you haven't
alluded to, but which I'll briefly mention. Suppose sixty percent of the people
in the state think one way and forty percent of the people think the other way.
If you just have strict majoritarianism, there's going to be a real danger of
expropriation. And under the basic scheme of the Civil Rights Amendments,
all of which took place post-Civil War, the whole purpose of those things,
ironically, was not to tell the federal government that it could regulate in areas
reserved to the state, but it was to put a huge federal filter over state actions,
so as to strike down many of these things under privileges and immunities,
due process, or equal protection.' 31 So, under the Fourteenth Amendment,
there's kind of a federal constitutional veto over state action.13 2 And that's a
very different arrangement than the one that's commonly understood today.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMIKOVICH: Okay. I think we have time for
one more question.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: There must be somebody.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMIKOVICH: Come on. Somebody's got to
finish this up for us.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: Why don't we have one-minute rebuttals?
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: We'll do one-minute rebuttals.
HON. PHILIP MISCIMARRA: Thank you very much. I will
make two points that haven't been addressed, and they're both related.
'3 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
132
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Number one-this session's topic makes reference to unintended
consequences. I believe that many companies have not only tried to do the
right thing for their employees, they have aspired to use their purchasing
power-with clients, vendors and other parties-to advance objectives
associated with broader concepts like social accountability and corporate
responsibility. If "employer" status results from any type of potential, indirect
control associated with one employer's efforts to positively influence others,
this will subvert many activities related to these broader notions of corporate
good citizenship. My second point is this: the Supreme Court, other courts,
and the NLRB have all recognized the validity of labor agreement unionstandards subcontracting provisions.13 3 These are contract clauses that only
permit subcontracting to other entities that pay their employees that equal or
exceed what is provided by the employer who signed the collective bargaining
agreement. 134 To the extent the employer requires any subcontractor to pay
its own employees certain types of wages and benefits, this constitutes joint
control over the subcontractor's employees. 135 However, the cases in this area
have never suggested this type of control makes the two entities 'jointemployers." Yet, this is what the Browning-Ferrisstandard would suggest,
even though I am confident such an outcome was never intended by the
Board. 136 Beyond these two examples, I think there are many additional
unintended and ill-advised consequences that follow from where the law has
gone in this area.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Dick.
RICHARD GRIFFIN, JR.: I would say the argument that Phil just
made is what I characterize as the "Bad Samaritan" argument. That is, you
want to be involved, you want good things to happen, but if you get involved
and good things don't happen, you don't want to be responsible for the
consequences. And that's typically the argument that's made in some of these
instances where you have large corporate actors who want to appear, from a
public relations standpoint, as though they're trying to do the right thing, but
if they don't make sure that the result occurs, and somebody says to them,
"You need to get involved and make sure that this good thing that you're
professing out in public, you're promoting, needs to happen." They say, "Oh,
no. It's not our responsibility. We don't want to have anything to do with
it." And so, my own view is, if you're going to take the thing on, and you
think it's a good idea, you ought to see it through and make sure it happens.
133 See, e.g., Russell A. Smith, Subcontracting and Union-Management Legal and Contractual
Relations, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 1272, 1278 (1966).
"3 See, e.g., "Hot Cargo"Agreements (Section 8(e)), NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb
.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/hot-cargo-agreements-section-8e (last visited June 15, 2020).
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"3 See generally 362 N.L.R.B No. 186, *1 (Aug. 27, 2015).
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In the legal tradition of the Good Samaritan, you don't have a responsibility,
but when you take it on, you have a responsibility to see that the appropriate
standard of care is exercised, period.
RICHARD EPSTEIN: The basic position that I would want to start
with is that competitive markets will outperform any unionized markets. One
cannot make that argument in the abstract with respect to a National Labor
Relations statute, which starts from the opposite premise. And so what you
have to do is start thinking about more limited arguments that will address
some of these issues. And I disagree with Dick that when you start talking
about these cases of divided control by McDonald's and so forth, all the firms
are trying to do is keep the control on the one hand and to keep their hands
clean on the other hand, when it turns out that their business model works. I
think that would be true, ifin fact, the standard franchise deal was all a sham
arrangement. But firms discovered through bitter experience that they cannot
possibly try to run a franchise entirely from the center, given the need of local
conditions and labor law and zoning law and all the other stuff.
So if there's a bona fide separation with respect to the activities in
question and you have a labor statute, it seems to me that the labor statute
should follow the business separation and you can try to unionize the subunits,
but you can't try to unionize McDonald's. And in fact, the bargaining
implications for that would be there are 3,000 McDonald's factory or outlets,
or 10,000-20,000 around the country. If they were joint-employers with all
of their particular franchisees, .1 have no idea of what kind of negotiations
they're going to be entered into.
It is important to have employers who are close to the ground. It is
important to have employers have relatively homogenous relationships. It's
important to have the situation where there's only one possibility for
unionization, not two, three, four, or five. And what the new rules on the
joint-employer situation do is to change that. And it cannot be that these rules
are just going back to the earlier situations because I'm not aware of any case,
and McDonald's has been around for a very long time, where it has ever been
exposed to a threat ofjoint-employer situations since 1962. So that would be
my last word.
HON. TIMOTHY TYMKOVICH: Who knew that the joint
employer could be that interesting and lively? Please join me in thanking the
panel.

